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THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment

24 September 1931

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NOTE FOR: NIO/NESA

FROM:

Special Assistant for Nuclear
Proliferation Intelligence

The attached is furnished FYI and in preparation for a meeting (to be scheduled later) to discuss the advisability of preparing an assessment of the prospects for a Middle Eastern Nuclear Weapon Free Zone. 25X1


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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Washington, D.C. 20451

September 1, 1981

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NFAC 5771-81

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation

PARTICIPANTS: Ambassador Ephraim Evron,
Israeli Ambassador to the US
Ambassador Hunan Bar 'On, Deputy
Secretary General of the Israeli
Foreign Office
Eugene V. Rostow, Director, ACDA

PLACE: Madison Hotel, Washington, D. C.

COPIES TO:

- S - Secretary Haig
- D - Judge Clark
- P - Amb. Stoessel
- T - Mr. Buckley
- M - Mr. Kennedy
- NEA - Amb. Veliotis
- PM - Mr. Burt
- DOD - Secretary Weinberger
- DOD - Under Secretary Ikle
- DOD - Mr. Perle
- DOD - JCS
- NSC - Mr. R. Allen
- CIA - Mr. W. Casey
- INR - Mr. R. Spiers
- Amembassy Tel Aviv - Amb. Lewis

Ambassador Evron had invited Mr. Rostow to lunch, to meet Ambassador Bar 'On, whom Mr. Rostow had known some years ago.

In the course of lunch, the following topics were discussed, Ambassador Bar 'On taking the lead in each case.

1. Pakistani Nuclear Weapons Development. Israel was increasingly concerned -- and very seriously concerned --

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about nuclear developments in Pakistan. Ambassador Bar 'On gave Mr. Rostow the attached memorandum (Tab A), along with a copy of Israel's letter on the subject to the Secretary General. Israel intends also to inform France of its concern, and to ask France likewise to take appropriate steps to persuade Pakistan (and China) to draw back from the brink.

Mr. Rostow welcomed the expression of Israeli concern. He said that the USG was also concerned and was actively pursuing the lines Israel suggested and others to persuade Pakistan not to become a nuclear weapons state. USG thought its influence in Pakistan was improved by US-Pakistani military cooperation.

2. Middle Eastern Nuclear Weapon Free Zone.

Ambassador Bar 'On reiterated Israel's positive interest in the projet. There were of course a number of pitfalls and traps, which should be anticipated now, so that Israel would not be in the position of having to vote against the Resolution. Israel would try to coordinate with Egypt before the UNGA, but in fact the habit of such coordination did not exist, despite the Egyptian policy in certain circles -- notably USG and American Jewry -- of implying that Israel and Egypt worked closely together. Cooperation of that kind occurred only at the top between Sadat and Begin. If any effective preparatory work was to be done on the subject, USG would have to do it, both with Egypt and with Israel.

Mr. Rostow said that USG was now actively considering the positions it would take with the Egyptians before and during the UNGA and the diplomatic scenario it would follow thereafter. We should certainly keep Israel informed and work closely with her. He explained that Egypt had indicated its strong interest in remaining the leader in the effort, a position USG would fully respect, coordinating its efforts with those of Egypt, Israel, and other interested nations. Among the points being examined within the USG, Rostow mentioned (1) the desirability of amending the Egyptian resolution to make it clear that peace in accordance with S.C. Resolution 338 and 242 was a necessary condition precedent to the establishment of a MENWFZ; (2) the question of an Experts Group, as recommended by the Egyptians and

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supported with reservations by the Israelis in 1980; and (3) broader questions about the geographical scope of the area covered, defense considerations, and others.

Ambassador Bar 'On commented that Israel was adamantly opposed to any plan which would have the MENWFZ come into existence, or seem to come into existence, by the action of some deus ex machina -- the Secretary General, the General Assembly, or the Security Council. In Israel's view, the only possible procedure was to have the states of the area negotiate a treaty which would then of course be deposited with the UN. The Zone would be established by the Treaty. That had been the procedure used in reaching the Treaty of Tlatelolco. He gave Rostow the attached package of documents (Tab B) and called attention particularly to the comments of Ambassador Fisher (US) at p. 47 of the excerpt from the GA debate.

Ambassador Bar 'On said Israel was equally opposed to an experts group chosen and created by the Secretary General. Only experts chosen by governments of the area could be effective.

Mr. Rostow said USG had not made up its mind on this point. Israel's views were helpful. If a group including states from outside the Middle East were established, all sorts of difficulties would arise, including an inevitable Soviet presence; on the other hand, if the meeting were confined to the states of the area, could such a group produce any results? Who would provide the necessary catalyst? Perhaps it was the only way to go forward, starting with Israel and Egypt, plus Morocco perhaps, or Saudi Arabia, with the United States in the corridor. The Camp David procedure, after all, should not be dismissed by any means.

Mr. Rostow said he had not thought of Ambassador Bar 'On's point about the deus ex machina, which was obviously important. He would consider and discuss it, and come back to him or Ambassador Evron as proved convenient.

Bar 'On asked also about where within the United States government the talks would be focussed. Rostow replied that ACDA was in charge of arms control negotiations, under the direction of the President and

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
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the Secretary of State, and would continue to coordinate American efforts on the project.

Rostow asked how the Israeli Foreign Office had reacted to his formula with respect to Israeli's adherence to NPT and Israeli's acceptance of IAEA safeguards. Bar 'On replied that if peace were made with Israel by the states of the region and a NWFZ negotiated, Israel would be living in a different world, and Israeli adherence to NPT could not be excluded. Evron added that perhaps "hope" was a more appropriate word than "expectation," which Rostow had used, but GOI couldn't object.

3. The Attempt to Expel Israel from IAEA. Bar 'On gave Rostow the attached document (Tab C) on the subject of the effort to expel Israel from the IAEA or to suspend its membership. Rostow noted that the United States had weighed in with an extremely strong statement the day before, and would continue to oppose the effort categorically.

Bar 'On inquired about our evaluation of the struggle over the Presidency of IAEA. Rostow said we were coming to the view that all the candidates should withdraw so that a new effort could be made. Bar 'On commented that this would mean another year for Eklund.


Eugene V. Rostow

Attachments:

Tab A - Memorandum
Tab B - Documents
Tab C - Document re Israel/IAEA

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Israel's concern with the Pakistani nuclear program is based on the following considerations:

1. Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program

Israel has learned that, in spite of frequent official denials, Pakistan is carrying out activities aimed at the establishment of a nuclear infrastructure which, upon completion and expansion, will enable her to produce and test nuclear weapons. Pakistan will be able to build a nuclear arsenal using weapons grade materials from one or both possible production courses: Uranium enrichment by centrifuges and plutonium separation by reprocessing.

For further details, see the enclosed document.

Recent reports indicate that Pakistan may soon carry out its first nuclear test on a site provided by the P.R.C.

2. The continuation of nuclear exports to Pakistan

Israel is aware of and concerned at Pakistan's close relationship with nuclear exporting countries in Europe, from which Pakistan acquired most of the components and material for its nuclear weapons program. In spite of reports about Pakistani preparations for nuclear weapons production, some governments in Western Europe did not take concrete steps to prevent various firms from supplying sophisticated nuclear technology for the Pakistani nuclear weapons program.

Israel has learned that following the disclosure of Pakistani intentions to build nuclear weapons, the French Government banned in 78-79 the export of sensitive components necessary for the construction of a large reprocessing plant (KNC²). There are signs, however, that Pakistan intends to reverse this trend and

renew cooperation with France for the purpose of completing the construction of the reprocessing plant.

3. Changes in the U.S. attitude towards Pakistan

Israel followed closely the recent negotiations between the U.S. and Pakistan which might involve a lifting of the Symington Amendment's application to Pakistan and the resumption of American military and economic aid to this country, despite the latter's activities aimed at the production of nuclear weapons. The result of such changes will undoubtedly mean the undisturbed completion of Pakistani re-processing and enrichment projects. //

4. Pakistan's relationship with the Arab States

Israel cannot lose sight of the fact that Pakistan and some of the more extreme Arab States maintain similar standpoints in their hostility towards Israel. Therefore, the reports on high-level contacts between Iraq and Pakistan for the development of a framework for cooperation in the nuclear field, are particularly significant for Israel. One cannot exclude the possibility that Pakistan could provide Iraq with a short cut to nuclear weapons. There have also been reports of Libyan and Saudi Arabian involvement in the Pakistani nuclear program.

Israel is fully aware of the deep concern of U.S. at the deterioration of the security of the strategically important Persian Gulf-Southwest Asia region. It is precisely because of this that the Government of Israel believes that it would be important that steps be taken to stop the Pakistani efforts to obtain nuclear weapons. It is within this context that consideration to the following measures might be given:

1. That West European Governments be persuaded to stop the export of nuclear materials and technologies to Pakistan and tighten nuclear export regulations in order to prevent Pakistan from exploiting loopholes.
2. France be asked to abstain from renewing its nuclear cooperation with Pakistan for the construction of the reprocessing plant KNC².